Baksh vs. CA

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

G.R. No. 97336
February 19, 1993

FACTS:

Private respondent is a 22 year old Filipino citizen residing in Dagupan CIty. Petitioner is an Iranian medical exchange student at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. Petitioner allegedly courted and proposed to marry her. Thereafter, private respondent began living with him. She allegedly was a virgin before such arrangement.

A week before the filing of private respondent’s complaint, petitioner’s attitute towards her started to change;; he maltreated and threatened to kill her. As a result, she sustained injuries. Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked not to live with her anymore.

Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney’s fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. Petitioner denied the claims of private respondent. Accordingly, he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent nor he forced her to live with him.

The lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a decision favoring the private respondent. The CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

WON a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code?

HELD:

Yes. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

Petitoner’s profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life’s partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

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