CIR vs. Primetown

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official capacity as Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 162155
August 28, 2007

FACTS:

Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes. Respondent complied, but the claim was not acted upon. Thus on April 14, 2000, it filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. CTA dismissed the petition having been filed beyond the two-­year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or credit under Section 229 of the NIRC. The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.

Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the CTA ruled that the two-­year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent’s petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period. The CA reversed the CTA decision ruling that Article 13 of the Civil Code does not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in referring to Article 13 of the NCC as the basis in the correct computation of time.

HELD:


NO. The Court of Appeals is correct in finding that the petition was filed within the prescriptive period but its basis is should not be the NCC. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. However, in 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides: Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — “Year” shall be understood to be twelve calendar months;; “month” of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains;; “day”, to a day of twenty-­four hours and;; “night” from sunrise to sunset.

A calendar month is “a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain.” It is the “period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month.” To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008;; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant. But being the more recent law, Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law and having impliedly repealed in its repealing clause all laws inconsistent therewith, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

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