D.M. Consunji, Inc. vs. CA

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.

G.R. No. 137873
April 20, 2001

FACTS:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. The victim was rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where investigation disclosed that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil Code, the election being equivalent to a waiver.

ISSUES:

1. Does the election made by the private respondent of one of the two inconsistent remedies equivalent to a waiver of the other?
2. Is there a valid waiver by the private respondent?
   
   

HELD:

1. Yes, the choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.
   
   
2. No, there is no valid waiver made by the private respondent in the case at bar because there was a mistake of fact. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact.
   
   
   In this case, the “fact” that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability. There is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom to prevent double recovery.

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