Montañez vs. Cipriano

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant,
vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 181089
October 22, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent Lourdes Cipriano married Socrates Flores on April 8, 1976. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano.

In 2001, respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. On July 18, 2003, the marriage of respondent with Socrates was declared null and void. Said decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003.

On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent. The respondent filed a Motion to Quash Information alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983. Hence, the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is wanting.

The RTC dismissed the case ruling that since the second marriage was contracted before the enactment of the Family Code, the judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not required as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage thereby rendering the second marriage valid.

ISSUE:

Is the declaration of the judicial nullity of the first marriage a valid defense for a charge of bigamy?

HELD:

NO. The subsequent nullification of the first marriage is immaterial to the commission of the crime of bigamy.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married;; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.

At the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.

Therefore, the dismissal of the charge of bigamy against respondent is improper.